Introduction
In the last two decades, both Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter simply referred to as Laos) have tried to reap the benefits from exposure to economic globalisation.
Nevertheless, rapid economic growth has not been accompanied with sufficient reductions in poverty levels. The two countries belong to the group of least developed countries (LDCs) and rising income and land inequality is alarming (So 2010; UNDP 2011; Howe and Sims 2011) . Worrying is the observation by leading experts on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) that the poor are ill-prepared to make ends meet, let alone improve their livelihoods. Whereas the middle class is clearly expanding in Thailand, Vietnam and China, the middle class and an active civil society is missing in Cambodia and Laos. In addition, the absence of political will to seriously address poverty reduction hampers long term inclusive development (Rehbein 2007;  * 이 논문은 서울대학교 발전기금에서 지원된 연구비에 의해 연구되었음. ** 서울대학교 사회과학대학 지리학과, edoandriesse@snu.ac.kr Andriesse2014; Kerbo 2011) .
While most publications deal with one country, this article offers a comparative perspective of rubber smallholders. Amidst the multifaceted and complex developments in the GMS selling (dried) latex, tapped from the rubber tree, the Hevea brasilensis, is becoming one of the major activities among rural communities in mainland Southeast Asia including Cambodia and Laos (Li and Fox, 2012) .
However, large scale rubber plantations in Cambodia and Laos have been associated with several negative phenomena: land grabbing, exploitation through contract farming ironically increasing rural poverty, economic and technological dependence on foreign investors and environmental degradation (Laungaramsri 2012 Kenny-Lazar, 2012 Li and Fox 2012; Baird, 2010; Cohen, 2009; Ziegler et al. 2009; Shi, 2008) .
Henceforth, there is a need to focus more on smallholders. Rubber smallholdings provide employment and do not lead to landlessness.
Furthermore, if intercropping is practiced and household members also engage in other (non-farm) income generating activities and become pluriactive villagers (Rigg, 2005; Bouahom et al., 2004) , poverty could be substantially reduced and socio-economic and environmental risks mitigated (Fox and Castella, 2013) . This article compares rubber smallholder livelihoods in Cambodia and Laos and investigates to what extent rural communities can benefit from the rubber boom and improve their livelihoods. This is done through a case study of smallholders in Tboung Khmum district in Cambodia and Ban Somsanouk in Laos. The empirical analysis is informed by three bodies of knowledge: micro-livelihoods studies as often carried out by development specialists and development geographers, global value chains by economic geographers and economists and the now substantial academic inquiry on the GMS by a range of social scientists. The empirical focus is on dynamic livelihoods' trajectories and ultimately livelihoods' outcomes; that is employment generation and poverty reduction (Scoones, 2009; De Haan and Zoomers, 2005) .
The case study strategy is instructive as it sheds light on
• Bottom-up development trajectories in the GMS in which rubber is one of the key industries
• Spatial and socio-economic relationships between the rubber industry and GMS corridor development The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the spatial project of the GMS in order to provide the geo-economic context before introducing current relationships between trends in the global rubber industry and rural livelihoods. This is followed by a section on the research methodology before presenting the results of the fieldwork in both areas. The discussion preceding the conclusion connects the results to wider debates of development within the GMS.
The GMS project
Both Cambodia and Laos form part of the now widely known spatial construct of the GMS. The GMS is a one of the most important projects of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in integrating the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, both in southern China, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam into one fully functioning economic area in which the mobility of people, services, goods, ideas and finance should lead to overall economic development and poverty reduction (Shrestha and Chongvilaivan, 2013; Rigg and Chusak, 2009 ). As such, it is the most ambitious geographically targeted scheme within South East Asia. In terms of concrete policies and funding, the ADB has been actively involved in supporting the deregulation of cross border flows and in funding infrastructural projects and GMS corridors. Although the ADB deserves credit, especially for promoting the construction of bridges and roads, several leading scholars on the GMS and international relations in Southeast Asia have pointed out that the predominantly neoliberal rhetoric, which the ADB and its supporters employed until recently, fails to consider three crucial features of national and sub-national political economy phenomena in reality.
First, an institutional mismatch exists. Note that institutions are considered here as the formal and informal rules of the game; not organisations (North, 1990) . The ADB envisions development trajectories based on the Washington Consensus: the presumption that opening up markets, deregulation and liberalisation, and the provision of infrastructure will automatically trigger employment generation and, ultimately, improved standards living for the majority of people.
In contrast, the political leaders of the GMS countries do frequently not treat their economies as havens of laissez-faire, but favour political economic strategies based on the Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo (BeST) Consensus, particularly the Chinese model (Lee and Mathews 2010) . The GMS countries are following this Consensus to a considerable extent; especially the philosophy that a visible hand is needed to achieve macro-economic and export successes. Vietnam and Laos are officially Communist countries; Prime Minister Hun Sen hasactively guided and steered the Cambodian economy and even
Thailand cannot be considered a true market economy.
Second, it is challenging for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), relatively poor people and small countries to catch up with large enterprises and multinationals, rich people and large countries respectively. Glassman (2010: 16) asserts that "the socio-spatial results of GMS development to date indicate that however willingly and aggressively smaller capitalists and traders participate in regionalization, it is in fact the most powerful and geographically mobile capitalists-including some who are Thai-that set the terms of integration while reaping disproportionate benefit". Thailand, as an established middle-income country, massively supported by the USA during the Cold War, possessing a significant state capacity and in the geographical heart of the GMS, can easily exploit the opportunities arising from greater international integration. Vietnam, an emerging economic powerhouse, is catching up with Thailand, but it is difficult for Cambodia and Laos to increase living standards at the same pace (Table 1) . (Rehbein, 2007: 96) .
According to Cornford (2006) 
Rubber and livelihoods
The economic geography of rubber
The traditional three big global players in the upstream rubber industry have been Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, but in the last decade rubber production in the GMS has grown dramatically A striking feature of natural rubber production is its reliance on smallholders. Fox and Castella (2013) ). This will likely generate a 300% increase of natural rubber production, but a lower increase in rubber export value given the expected decline in international rubber price. Cambodia's Prime
Minister Hun Sen foresees more than 1 million workers in the rubber industry, which would correspond to approximately 14% of the labour force. While his forecast is probably somewhat too optimistic, there is little doubt that the rubber industry will continue to grow in both countries, especially in Cambodia. Unfortunately however, the political economies of both countries favour the establishment of big agro-industrial plantations rather than intercropping plantations with the support of foreign investors from GMS partners (Andriesse 2014 , Keating 2012 Slocomb, 2011; Global Witness 2007) .
Rubber smallholders in the GMS
Despite prioritizing large scale plantations more and more farmers As mentioned in the previous section, drivers of change might be negative in the case of pressures from large scale corporate plantation owners, but change in the GMS could also be positive. There is increasing evidence that rubber farmers and small scale traders in northern Laos are also able to act relatively independently from corporate actors and governmental authorities with positive outcomes in terms of inclusive development within the GMS (Lagerqvist, 2013; Sturgeon, 2013) . Notwithstanding the substantial problems and challenges the possibility of positive patterns and trends is important since "If the Lao PDR is not part of the regional value chain, the economic benefits from enhanced regional transport connectivity may not be equally profitable for the Lao PDR, and regional road networks developed through the GMS Corridors Programme could pass through the Lao PDR without bringing any meaningful economic benefit to its people" (Oudet, 2013:44) .
Much less is written on Cambodian smallholders. Saing (2009) concluded that "overall, Cambodia's rubber export competitiveness remains weaker than in all the countries of the region, except for the Its, poverty rate is less than 20% (Epprecht et al., 2008: 28) . Table   3 summarises the major results of the empirical inquiry. The discussion below follows the sequencing in this table.
Basic information and land
An important result which is necessary to take into account in the analysis below is the relatively low educational level in both Tboung Khmum and Ban Somsanouk. In both research areas the majority of respondents received little education. In Tboung Khmum only 1 respondent received tertiary education; in Ban Somsanouk 4.
Although growing rubber trees has been an older activity in Tboung
Khmum not all respondents possess official land titles. This is a vulnerable situation, increases the risks of land grabbing, hampers expanding assets and providing collateral. It could also create intra-village competition and inequality (Fujita and Khamla, 2008) .
A major difference between the two research sites is the extent of intercropping. Many smallholders in Tboung Khmum continue to grow cassava, especially in the first seven years of growing rubber when latex cannot yet be tapped, whereas the Lao smallholders do Second, smallholders in Ban Somsanouk were clearly lured by investment firms, both Lao and Chinese, to started growing rubber.
The role of investment firms is further discussed below. 
The upstream value chain

Standard of living and the future
As mentioned in the section rubber smallholders in the GMS financial issues are essential with respect to the standard of living and socioeconomic sustainability. Table 3 
Conclusion
This study has sought to unravel the ongoing rubber boom in Cambodia and Laos from the perspective of smallholders and their changing livelihoods in the spatial-institutional setting of GMS integration. Their increasing insertion in Asian rubber value chains creates opportunities to benefit from international economic trends.
Overall, rubber smallholdings appear to be promising and a much better alternative to large scale plantations leading to processes of landlessness. The majority of villagers mentioned higher standards of living as one of the major benefits of tapping latex. Yet a number of challenges continue to make rubber a cash crop that will not singlehandedly solve all rural hardships; most notably considerable socio-economic insecurity during the period of approximately seven years in which rubber trees mature and alternative income generating activities sources are a required for resilient rural livelihoods.
Given the expected future decline in rubber prices further research should reveal more precisely the linkages between growing rubber and socioeconomic security. It should be kept in mind, however, that prices could unexpectedly rise, especially in the case of dramatically higher oil prices during geopolitical crises which would decrease the demand for synthetic rubber. For Cambodian smallholders it is also useful to find out the potential impact of a future bridge over the Mekong along the Dawei-Bangkok-Phom Penh-Ho Chi Minh city corridor. Will it, for instance, facilitate agricultural exports to Vietnam? More policy oriented research is also welcome regarding the diversification of rural communities. The average size of rubber landholdings is rather small and thus there is a sustained need to study other socioeconomic options in order to increase living standards. 
